A Different Approach to Understanding Democracy
An ecumenical approach to government systems
This may prove a bit long and worth saving for when you have time for a thoughtful read. I find it a very valuable and somewhat novel approach to an important issue. It is an essay by John Ryder, a noted philosopher and friend.
A Case for Ecumenism Among Political Forms
It is commonplace for those of us in the English-speaking world, and elsewhere, to support democracy, usually liberal democracy, as a valuable form of political organization. We tend to do this in two respects, the first concerning governmental organization and the second concerning social practices and mores, which is to say democracy as a way of life. With respect to governmental organization, we tend to support democracy, particularly in the form of free and fair contested elections, as a way of ensuring that a nation’s government is answerable to its citizens. With respect to social practices and mores, the defense of democracy usually rests on the fact that it enables or even encourages individuals to exercise freely our intelligence and creativity, individually or in community, in constructing our lives according to our own lights. The defense of democracy in its first, political, form is a couple hundred years old, and its defense in its social dimension is more than a century old, having been articulated in detail by John Dewey, and by many others since Dewey’s time.
Let us take as a given that acceptable arguments for democracy in both of these forms have been offered. Interestingly, though, in the course of arguing for the value of democracy, we tend to slide into arguments in support of the superiority of (liberal) democracy over other political forms. On this latter view, democracy is to be preferred over monarchy, or one-party rule, or theocracy, or exclusionary nationalist governments, or any other possible form of political and social organization. This argument holds, basically, that democracy better than any alternative enables popular rule and individual development, and is therefore the political form most suited to human life. If that is right, then it is best for all people to live in liberal democracies, from which view it is sometimes argued that powerful democratic nations have a moral duty to spread democracy around the world.
It is important that we not make this slide, implicitly or explicitly, from the value of democracy to its superiority. While there is good reason, as I have suggested, to accept the claim that democracy is a valuable form of political organization, there are no good reasons to accept the claim that democracy is in general superior to all others. The alternative I should like to propose is an ecumenism with respect to political forms, which means basically that while one might have good reason to prefer one political form over another, that reason would not imply that one’s preferred political form is superior to others. This is not a form of relativism, though the explanation of how it is not relativism must wait a bit. For now, we need to consider what it means to embrace a kind of ecumenism with respect to political forms.
Ecumenism of course is a term most relevant to religious traditions, sometimes used to relate only to forms of Christianity and sometimes to religions more generally. I am here using it in its more general form. There are also weak and strong versions of ecumenism. A weaker version would hold that it is desirable for a person to tolerate religious traditions other than one’s own, while a stronger version would mean that a person would acknowledge the equal legitimacy of religious traditions other than one’s own. For our purposes, I would like to appeal to a general and strong sense of ecumenism. Limiting ourselves to the context of religions for the moment, ecumenism is the belief in the equal legitimacy of a wide range of religious traditions, though not necessarily all of them, while committing oneself to only one of them.
I will suppose for a moment that I am a Roman Catholic and an ecumenist in this sense. I would in that case hold that my preference is not for Christianity generally, but for its Roman Catholic version. This religious tradition makes the most sense for me, for any number of reasons, and I can to my own satisfaction answer any challenges to its adequacy as a viable religion. I feel no compulsion, or even inclination, to convert to any different religion. As an ecumenist, though, I am fully prepared to acknowledge that most other people endorse with equal conviction a range of other religious traditions, sets of beliefs, and spiritual practices. While none of those others are suitable for me, I can without contradiction recognize that they are suitable for other people. To offer one example of what this might look like, as a Roman Catholic I may be convinced of the triune nature of God, but I can also recognize that my judgment is fallible, and that my reason for being religiously and epistemically comfortable with the trinity may rest on a variety of social, psychological, and other factors. That I am convinced of the trinity does not imply that I think that those who understand God or the spiritual grounding of their lives in some other way hold an inferior point of view. To that extent, my Roman Catholicism is not, in my view, superior as a religion to many or most others.
If we are not careful about how we understand this, our ecumenism can easily be trivialized. To recognize the possibility of multiple understandings of and approaches to spirituality and religion is not equivalent to the dismissive idea that “anything that floats your spiritual boat is as good as anything else.” To say this would be to take no religion seriously. To take seriously religions more generally, which is what ecumenism purports to do, requires that we be clear about what makes a religious tradition legitimate. For my hypothetical Roman Catholic self, my religion provides me with the tools I need and want to give spiritual meaning to my life, and it does so without compelling me to commit to behavior and commitments that are manifestly self-destructive or destructive of others. Other people find such tools in other religious traditions. To that extent, they are equally legitimate. Of course, it is possible for religious ideals to be invoked to manipulate people into commitments and behavior that are manifestly self-destructive, if for example they are told by a swindling preacher that they should give everything they have to him, or that they are members of a special community that is under threat, such that to avoid suppression they must commit mass suicide. These are clearly illegitimate commitments and sets of beliefs, and the fact that they are given a religious or spiritual veneer does not alter that fact. For this reason, ecumenism does not force us to accept such distortions of religious belief as of equal value to our own, even while it pushes us to a broad acceptance of forms of spirituality.
Some religious ideals may also be invoked to manipulate people into behavior and commitments that are manifestly destructive of others. This has probably been more common than not among many religious traditions. Christians have tortured, enslaved, and killed non-Christians, and done so for supposedly religious reasons. Similarly, and to this day, some Hindus kill Muslims, some Buddhists kill Muslims, some Muslims kill non-Muslims, Jews and Muslims kill one another, etc. But there is nothing about Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, or Islam that requires such perversions of scripture and spiritual foundations. An ecumenist may say, without self-contradiction, that religious justifications of behavior that is oppressive and destructive of others are not legitimate, while at the same time recognizing the equal legitimacy of a range of differing religious traditions.
This latter point suggests another important caveat, which will be especially relevant when we turn to political forms, and that is that to recognize the legitimacy of a religion and its spiritual practices does not automatically imply the acceptance of everything that is done in the name of that religion. I can be a Roman Catholic and still object when a cardinal blesses the military hardware on its way to war, as I can be a Catholic in good standing while opposing the simultaneous wealth of the Vatican and impoverishment of many of my fellow Catholics. Hindus may object to a caste system that sometimes receives religious justification, as may a Buddhist object to a quietism in the face of grave injustice. To accept the equal legitimacy of a number of often quite different spiritual traditions does not imply or require sacrificing one’s critical discrimination or capacity for moral judgment. Ecumenism simply implies the recognition that people may legitimately meet their spiritual needs and may find meaning in their lives in many different ways.
A follower of any religion has three possible ways of regarding members of other faiths: 1) they are followers of a false faith, and are therefore dangerous and need to be defeated or converted; 2) they are followers of another faith which, even if one does not agree with its tenets, should be tolerated and respected, though ideally conversion is preferrable; and 3) they are followers of a different religious tradition, one which may be as capable as mine of providing spiritual strength and sustenance. The first approach describes the attitude of the Christian crusaders, and whatever contemporary remnants of this attitude to the world that may remain; the second defines the perspective of the traditional missionary, who respects the other, but nevertheless believes that it is his responsibility to direct the deluded onto the right path; the third is the ecumenist.
A contemporary democrat has roughly the same three possibilities in the approach to other forms of political organization. The democrat may: 1) regard democracy as the best, maybe even best possible, form of government, all others being therefore inferior and deserving of the dustbin of history; 2) regard democracy as superior to other political forms, be willing to tolerate them if necessary, but prefer that the superior virtues of democracy be made clear to the unenlightened; and 3) choose democracy as the most desirable for himself, but recognize that it is not necessarily superior to some other political forms that may meet the needs of their people as well as may democracy. The first of these possibilities expresses the view that it is the responsibility of democracies to introduce democracy, by force if necessary, to any nation that suffers under the burden of an inferior and unacceptable political system; the second expresses the view of those who, while not disposed to violent imposition of democracy, believe in the necessity of continuous assertion of the superiority of democracy and its values, with the hope of one day converting other nations to the one, true political system; and the third is the democratic ecumenist, and it is this view that I wish to defend.
There are several prima facie reasons for preferring political ecumenism to the alternatives. The first, and most obvious, is our own fallibility. Even those of us who are thoughtful and committed to a reasonably well-articulated and defended understanding of democracy may be missing something, and so would be wise to adopt a bit of modesty with respect to the virtues of our own opinions. A second reason is that the other two possibilities do not work. Any effort to impose democracy is misguided from the start and is more likely than anything else to deepen the suspicion of democracy on the part of those who do not endorse or support it. There are many examples in recent history of this phenomenon. Along similar lines, the less aggressive approach has the same shortcomings that religious missionary zeal embodies. A traditional missioner may believe that he is offering the salvation of the non-believer’s soul by insisting on the superiority of his own religious tradition, but doing so embodies, even if unintentionally, a deep disrespect for the other and for the spiritual and social traditions of other spiritual forms. The “tolerant” democrat has the same problem. Insisting on the superiority of democracy over another’s political form and traditions is, even if unintentionally, to embrace a disrespect for the other, one that is in fact inconsistent with democratic principles.
A political ecumenism is the most consistent position for a democrat, and it is the one least likely to backfire. Political ecumenism appears to be the most consistent position for a democrat if one draws one’s sense of democracy from John Dewey. In Democracy and Education (Chapter 7) Dewey says that he rests his understanding of democracy on two traits of successful communities. The first is that members of a community have interests in common, which give the community its character and identity. This could be true, though, of a “gang of thieves”, as he puts it, as well as other communities. The problem with the gang of thieves is that by its nature it has to remain a closed community, and that is also the source of its inadequacy and eventual downfall. A successful community must be one in which its members are open to members of other communities, and from this follows the second of the traits Dewey emphasizes: a successful community is one in which its members not only share some set of interests, but they also pursue common interests with members of other communities. From these two traits, Dewey says, he derives his conception of democracy.
If we want to accept some version or other of this approach to democracy, then as democrats we are compelled to engage with those outside our community with a presumption of moral parity and the respect required to pursue common interests. The point applies to the way democracies engage non-democratic polities as much as it does to the engagement of any two communities with one another. This can only be done if we grant from the beginning the possibility that a non-democratic form of political organization deserves our respect as much as does a democracy, and that can be the case only if we are prepared to acknowledge that a non-democratic polity can be as valuable for its citizens as a democracy can be.
We may now point out why political ecumenism is not a form of relativism. The vague phrase “valuable for its citizens” was just used, which even in its vagueness suggests that there is a criterion on the basis of which we may judge whether any political form is worthy of an ecumenical attitude toward it. Just as a religious expression that leads inevitably to self-destruction or the destruction of others is not one that merits ecumenical support, so there is a comparable criterion with respect to political forms. A polity, to use a term that encompasses the details of governmental structures and corollary features of the exercise of political power, can be expected to do what is possible to enable for each of its citizens a life of rich, meaningful experience. If a political form can do that, though it would invariably be done imperfectly, it is worthy of the respect embodied by political ecumenism.
That this criterion of political adequacy prevails both helps us avoid relativism and it suggests the likelihood that not all extant political forms meet it. On the one hand, it seems clear that some political forms other than liberal democracy can offer their citizens the conditions necessary for experientially rich and meaningful lives. On the other, it also seems clear that some do not. One could make a plausible case, I think, that such countries as the People’s Republic of China, or the Russian Federation, or the United Arab Emirates, to select three quite different examples, can and do enable to some significant extent a rich and meaningful life for their citizens, or at least many of them. There are other countries, though, that do not. To draw on my own experience, I would offer contemporary Azerbaijan as an example. This is a country that, given its extensive oil resources, could be a thriving home for all its citizens. Instead, its government functions as a kind of organized crime, reaching all the way down to the street level, where local authorities and the police operate as a shakedown operation and protection racket. The wealth of the country’s resources enriches the ruling family and buys off those whose support it needs, while a large percentage of the population continues to live in dire circumstances, material and otherwise. There is no plausible sense in which one could describe the Azerbaijani polity as one that provides it citizens with the appropriate conditions for meaningful lives and a richness of experience. Unfortunately, there are no doubt many such countries and governments.
So, the criterion of political adequacy allows us to distinguish between those countries that warrant ecumenism and those that do not. We should not, however, allow the criterion to minimize the relevance of other political and moral judgments that are often called for. Again, there is a comparison available with religion. The point was made earlier that it is reasonable to accept or endorse a particular religious tradition and still criticize those of its feature and activities that warrant criticism. There is no shortage of shortcomings among the world’s religions that deserve criticism, often severe criticism, and there is no inconsistency in a member of a religious community criticizing that community’s shortcomings. Political forms and their specific instantiations present the same situation. One can endorse democracy, for example in the US, and still be critical of its failures, some of which have been and continue to be monumental. One can also recognize that a country like Russia or China can be a legitimate political form deserving of ecumenical respect, yet acknowledge and criticize its failings, some of which also have been monumental. Political ecumenism does not, in other words, require either relativism or moral collaborationism. On the contrary, political ecumenism calls for moral respect and engagement when a political form warrants it, and for political and moral criticism when circumstances require it.
This, it seems to me, is a reasonable case for political ecumenism. And on that basis, we ought to make every effort in our political theorizing, and in engagements with other nations and their peoples, to avoid the slide from an endorsement of democracy to an insistence on its superiority. The latter does not follow from the former, and is in fact inimical to it.
John Ryder
Tucson AZ
May 7, 2021