A Further Discussion of Partisan Realignment

The battle of alternative narratives of the good society.

I promised to send out one more post on realignment theory. Here it is.

First, I want to mention how the model, although based on empirical observations of partisan shifts in voting behavior, was originally rather mechanical. Early proponents described how a homogeneous society might become divided into rival political factions as new opportunities and threats create serious disagreements as to desirable government policy. If serious enough, such divisions would lead to partisan factions forming rival political movements (parties) and contesting elections.

If party conflict and election choices were thus organized by a strong “cleavage,” these party divisions would remain in place until they were replaced by a new issue which divided the population in a different way, that is, along a different line of conflict. The parties would then be forced to adjust to this new division, or they would lose support. After a period of uncertainty, a new partisan alignment would develop that divided the vote along the new line of conflict.

Many scholars tended to “see” such changes in party dynamics as occurring regularly with a period of around 30 to 40 years between “realignments.”

By now the consensus opinion is that this view was oversimplified. There can be partial realignments and longer periods of adjustments between fundamental shifts of partisan identity and there is no inevitability that such processes will always redirect social conflicts into election battles between two political organizations.

There are also questions as to whether a new “cleavage” is truly “new.” I fall into the camp that sees the contemporary replacement of one axis of conflict by another as more the reemergence of an older cultural division rather than a fundamentally new axis of conflict.

The more I think about the utility of realignment theories to explain present political reality, and the more I read about American political history, the more I am developing my own “take” on partisanship and voting choice in the U.S.

Briefly put, I see enduring cultural narratives that express basic divisions in the society that periodically gain ascendent importance for the partisan identities of voters. That is, current threats, fears and hardships faced by Americans, may reactivate past electoral cleavages, partisan alignments that have remained largely dormant beneath the surfaces of political life.

Let me describe two of these. One is what I call nativist nationalism, the “America for Americans” movements. This view claims that WE have succeeded as a nation because WE have shared the same beliefs and participated together to conquer a wilderness, defeated enemies both foreign and domestic, and built a rich and powerful nation. And WE and our children deserve to enjoy the results.

It is a view, however, that has always been challenged by a belief that it is our very diversity (ethnic, religious, and cultural), that gives us our strength and our purpose as a nation.

The nationalist mantra goes like this: we are White; we are Christian (in a particular way); we are native born; we are “the common people.” It is not just our abstract values that are different (in fact, all “mouth” similar patriot phrases), but how we have put them to use in building social, political and economic structures which defined our place in society, our value to society, and our core identity as a people worthy of respect.

When this set of beliefs is mobilized for political action, it can be very powerful. “We are the people of the Promise. Our “fathers” lived, fought and died to sustain that promise for their children and their children. We have a “right” to prosperity. The “system” (economic and social) was built to provide this for us as long as we play by the rules and work hard.”

“But, the Promise is denied us when “others,” outsiders, foreigners, or domestic “elites,” take it from us. Push us aside, control our government and manipulate law and the administration of law for their advantage.”

I believe that native nationalism can find many different enemies. From the beginning of the nation, those with social power due to education and parentage, have been seen as “foreign” to the true spirit of America. They were accused of aristocratic pretensions. They were said to expect to be treated like an upper class, and aped European (British) cultural ways.

Similarly, Native Americans and people of African descent were seen as outsiders and a threat to the “real” America. Each wave of immigration as well. The color line, or distinction, has been important. Third generation immigrants have passed the “white” test. We see this today as Hispanics are “whitening.” Brown has always managed to be the new White.

Over and over again, the cry is that “WE” deserve (birthright) and “they,” helped by government, are taking our jobs, is a potent rallying cry. It also can be used to stigmatize (enemyize) many varieties of “others,” i.e. those who are trans, or secular, or eat quiche.

Corporate America can manipulate these emotional views to cast doubt on the science and expertise of elites that threaten profit margins through “excessive regulation.” In fact, the category of “the other” has always been available in times of economic panic to identify the causes of our “troubles.”

In this way it becomes a counter narrative to the other way in which we have understood our divisions and organized our political life.

This is the economic-system-reform-agenda. From the beginning of the Republic, partisan alliances have been forged to oppose the overreach of concentrations of economic power and pass laws to regulate free-market (i.e. capitalistic) economies. Cronyism, money supply (Free Silver), banking practices, monopolies, unsafe products, dangerous working conditions, and unfair wage rates, have all been, at one time or another, partisan issues. And these narratives have been met by strong counter arguments. Much of the work of professional economists has been to provide justifications for the existing economic system.

This has been expressed at times, i.e. the early 19th century, as a battle over freedom of commercial transactions (Lockean Liberalism) as opposed to republican (small r) virtue, i.e. private individual interests vs. the public good.

I suggest that we have seen an alteration of these two fundamental lines of contention throughout our history. They represent alternative explanations of the failures of the economic system to provide its “promise.” Each lies in wait to be mobilized for partisan advantage. Which narrative captures the minds of the voter will, during a period of realignment, determine which party is in control of the government and the subsequent development of government policies.

Are there other “sleeping” lines of fundamental conflict? Perhaps. We may want to look closely at the Trump coalition and his resulting policies. Is this realignment process merely traditional nativism mixed with regulatory reform or is it a more far-reaching project? Some would argue that we are hovering over a much older and far more powerful division, a fundamental disagreement over the value of democracy itself. We need to think about this.

This would result in a third realignment narrative that cannot be settled by electoral politics since the legitimacy of majoritarian electoral outcomes itself is central to the narrative.