Many students of global politics focus their attention on the relationships between States. Their analysis gives special attention to the changes that have affected alliance patterns among States in recent years and especially the fact that the United States no longer dominates the international order as it did after the end of the “Cold War.
They see the emerging self-interest of many newly industrializing States as a sign of increasing disorder in the international system. They see “order” as stable alliance patterns between States and thus the present world as “disordered.”
Many say that the efforts of American foreign policy to rebuild such a stable pattern of alliances as desirable and necessary to avoid war and suffering in this century. Others say such policies are out of step with reality and less attuned to these times than, say, the policies of the Chinese government, which they claim accepts disorder as a fundamental characteristic of the system.
Both, it seems to me, are a world view that owes much to the historical analysis of inter-state politics in the 19th century, where stability seemed to rely on shifting patterns of alliances between major European powers.
This analysis treats States as power/security-seeking entities engaged in a struggle to promote their own, and narrow, separate interests. (Which not surprisingly turn out to be the economic interests of powerful people who have great influence over government policies.)
In this light the conflict between States resembles a game board of players, where the impulse to “win” is countered by stable alliances that thwart such an outcome and lead to a temporary form of peace, or as many would say, stability.
In this view the breakdown of such a stability creates a dangerous world.
While it seems true that the “clear” divisions of alliances and trading partners that shaped the international scene since World War II have given way to a world of multiple centers of power, this need not be seen as a necessary condition of disorder. Nor need we view the present world as veering toward uncertain chaos.
In my view this State center view of a global society is significantly flawed and therefore the conclusions that we draw from it, misleading.
We are living in a time of many strong alliances and allegiances, institutional and informal, that crisscross the world. We are engaged across national boundaries in economic, scientific, cultural and humanitarian efforts. Our lines of communication are not simply instantaneous but focused and diffused across many areas of mutual interest and concern.
We develop understanding and share responsibility for many global crises and conditions. We form families across what were once impossible or unlikely or forbidden boundaries.
It is not that the nation state has lost its power, nor silenced its champions. Its capacity for violence and its sanctuaries for vicious nationalism exist in the clearest possible sight. It is instead that counterbalancing communities of peoples that transcend these limitations are growing at a staggering rate.
Yes, this implies far greater complexity. But stability, not instability, is built upon coherences that accept and profit from complexity. We are expanding our experience of each other, through travel and mutual work and greater opportunities to discover mutual interests.
We have begun to see the end of our oldest misperception of reality, our tribal cast of mind.
We have begun to live in one interdependent world.