Moving Toward a Compromise Settlement for Ukraine

Russia, Ukraine, and the Conflict of International Principles, by John Ryder

The following is a somewhat longer than usual piece by my friend, the philosopher John Ryder. I have debated with him, vigorously, some of the arguments he uses, but I believe, as he does, that an end to the fighting and a compromise settlement must involve both of the two principles that he discusses. If any of you want to raise as “comments” your own reservations, I will post them in a separate blog and add my own. Then let John have the last word. So please comment. War is a killing field of men, women and children.

One aspect of the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and in fact of several important international events in recent years, is that it embodies a conflict between two basic and important principles of international relations: the inviolability of established state borders on the one hand, and the right of peoples to self-determination on the other. It is worthwhile to think through this issue and to see whether any useful way of handling the conflict presents itself.

When states undertake actions in the international arena that have extensive consequences, for good or ill, there are more than a few possible causes of such actions. Typically, states act to enhance wealth, or power, or favorable position in this or that respect, or for revenge, or for internal political reasons, among others. Principles are rarely if ever a cause of such actions. They are, however, a common feature of any state’s attempt to explain and justify its actions, as is often demanded of them. In the case of US foreign policy, for example, the state will typically defend its actions, especially if they are controversial, by asserting their necessity in the defense of human rights, or democracy, or freedom. Whether such appeals are genuine or cynical is an important question, but the point here is that even though states do not act with principles as a cause, principles are nonetheless necessary in the justifications of actions. Presumably, such justifications are sufficient if the principles appealed to are themselves defensible and if they are appropriate to the issue in question. It also helps if the appeal to the principles in any specific case is made honestly and consistently, rather than being cynically self-serving.

The current war in Ukraine, which has turned out to be a military struggle between the Russian Federation and both Ukraine and NATO generally, at least to a limited but growing extent, is no exception to the observation that principles are a significant feature of international affairs. There is no shortage of specific issues and principles that we could discuss. For example, as this is being written, the US has just agreed to send cluster munitions to Ukraine to use on the battlefield. Washington has frequently accused countries of which it does not approve of using cluster bombs, for example both Russia and Syria in the recent Syrian civil war, and has held that nations that use such weapons are acting badly, indeed committing war crimes. Apparently, though, such condemnation does not apply to the US itself or to Ukraine, at least from Washington’s point of view, so here is a case in which an appeal to a principle does not pass the consistency test. Consistent or not, there are many such cases in the current war in which principles are appealed to, in fact whenever one side or the other is criticized for doing the wrong thing: attacking civilian targets, attacking infrastructure, assisting neo-fascist military and civilian groups, etc.

I would like to leave such specific issues aside for now and consider the more general principles that are at stake, and which seem to be in conflict. Ukraine, NATO, the EU in general, and the whole of the G7, criticize Russian’s invasion of Ukraine on the grounds, among others, that it is a violation of the fundamental principle of the inviolability of established state borders. For its part, Russia has justified its action by appealing to the generally acknowledged principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, in this case the right of the citizens of Crimea, Donetsk, and Lugansk, at least, to determine for themselves whether they wish to remain part of Ukraine, to be independent, or to merge with Russia. Here is a case, then, in which two important and generally accepted principles have come into conflict. We would be wise to think about what to make of this fact, and to consider how to proceed in the face of such a conflict. Is it to be resolved simply by power, or perhaps there may be a way to decide in such a conflict which principle ought to take precedence?

Two points should be made initially. First, though both sides in this conflict have various reasons for having gotten into it in the first place, the fact is that both sides appeal to the principles that support their actions. In fact, both sides, if we’re thinking about Russia and NATO, endorse both principles. NATO in the Ukraine case is resting its justification on the inviolability of borders, but when it tore Kosovo away from Serbia it rested its case on the right of self-determination for the Albanians there. Russia, for its part, opposed NATO’s actions in Kosovo by appeal to the inviolability of Serbia’s borders, and defends its actions in Ukraine by appeal to the right of peoples of the Donbas and Crimea to self-determination. Leaving aside the consistency question that applies to both sides, it is clear that the principles are meaningful for both.

And there is good reason that they should be meaningful. Both the inviolability of borders and the right to self-determination are enshrined in fundamental UN documents and elsewhere, documents that Russia, Ukraine, the US, and all other members of the UN endorse by virtue of their membership. Chapter 1, Article 2 of the UN Charter says, among other things, that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” There are also specific treaties in which the borders of the signatory countries are agreed to be respected. Similarly, Chapter 1, Article 1 of the UN Charter commits member countries to the self-determination of peoples, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which came into effect in 1966 and binds all member countries, says that "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Both documents use the term “peoples” rather than “countries” or “states”, though neither specifies what counts as a “people.” It is not, presumably, restricted to existing states, especially since influential states, for example NATO member states, appeal to this principle in defense of such break away regions as Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh. It seems that “peoples” covers at least states and regions, if not smaller areas.

If that is right, then the principle of self-determination applies not only to Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh, but also to such regions of existing countries as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Crimea, Lugansk, and Donetsk, as well as to such a place as Taiwan, whether one treats it as an independent country, as at least some do, or a region, as the PRC and other countries that publicly respect the “one China” principle do. With respect to Ukraine, three of its regions seceded in 2014 in reaction to the coup in Kiev that overthrew the elected government. Presumably, those regions have a right, as defined by the UN, to self-determination, no less than the Albanian population of Kosovo and the Armenian population of Karabakh, which they have expressed in their decisions to join the Russian Federation. (I leave aside Zaporozhe and Kherson, since in those cases the integrity of the electoral decision to join Russia seems less than clear. They would, though, have no less a right to self-determination than do the others.)

So, there is a conflict at the level of general principles. For the most part, the two principles in question get along without a problem. One would think that it is a responsibility of states in their foreign affairs to make every effort to see that the two principles continue to get along, though the more powerful countries have a record of dubious behavior in this regard. Had the West and Ukraine respected the agreements in the Minsk Accords, the conflict could have been defused, at least with respect to the Donbas. There are circumstances, though, as in the case of the regions mentioned above, in which for one reason or another a conflict arises. We are entitled to ask ourselves, and to ask the UN leadership, which takes precedence? It seems to me that even in those cases in which the problem arises through legally and morally dubious activity, for example the NATO attack on Serbia, or the Russian attack on Ukraine, we ought to give precedence to people’s moral importance over the integrity of states, which means that when the two principles collide, we ought to defer to the self-determination of peoples over the integrity of states.

We have to say that even if this is right, nothing necessarily follows about how states should handle efforts by their own populations to assert independence. Spain faces this issue in Catalonia, as does the UK in Scotland. Nothing necessarily follows in such cases because there can be, and are, other political and moral principles at stake. For example, it is generally preferable for peoples to act and live together rather than to splinter. The devil is often in the details, but that principle would have to be weighed against the generally acknowledged right of people to self-determination.

One would hope, though, that when the powers that be come to their senses and begin to discuss an end to the current conflict in Ukraine, the right of peoples to self-determination will be treated as a more important principle than the inviolability of borders to enshrine in whatever is the final agreement. On these grounds, and because the conflict of principles in these cases seems unavoidable, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Taiwan, and similarly placed regions should decide their own destiny, regardless of the borders that have defined them in recent years. The same applies to the people of Crimea and the Donbas, at least, for whom the right of self-determination is more important than the integrity of Ukraine’s previous borders. No other priority would embody the respect for people and peoples that our often-stated commitment to rights and democracy would require.