While, on the surface, the points raised in the post seem valid, there are some countervailing considerations that should be taken into account.
First, on the accusation that the US has abandoned principle when offering cluster munitions to Ukraine while the use by others - Russia in this case, but others as well - has been a subject of criticism by the United States, I am reminded of an analogy used by a political philosopher of the not-too-distant past. His observation was that of two men - one who pushed an old lady into the path of a bus, while another pushed an old lady out of the path of a bus. To refer to both of them simply as men who pushed little old ladies is to make a comparison that is puerile at best, reprehensible at worst.
The concern is that cluster munitions pose an unacceptable risk to the civilian population and other noncombantants. It is an unfortunate reality that ANY weapon, used improperly, can pose an unreasonable risk to the civilian population and other innocent noncombatants. Based on what is publicly available, it appears that the weapons provided by the USA to Ukraine are qualitatively different than those used by Russia and, indeed, those used in the past even by Ukraine. We also know that, while Ukraine goes to extraordinary lengths to protect the civilian population from unnecessary harm, Russia has been, and continues to deliberately target the civilian population. While Ukraine does intend to use these cluster munitions against Russian invading forces, there is every indication that appropriate care is being taken to minimize the risk to the civilian population. Some very good analysis on this subject has been posted on the website "Lawfire" managed by Prof. Charlie Dunlap of Duke law School (https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/tag/cluster-munitions/).
On the assertions by Russia that they are doing nothing more than "protecting" the right of self-determination of the residents of Crime and the other illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, several points need to be made.
First, Russia's action, an invasion and occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent invasion in 2022, several points need to be made: First, that there was no popular request for self-determination made before Russia's invasions. Second, Russia did not bring the matter to the UN SC raising these concerns before its violation of Article 2(4) by launching a war of aggression (even assuming, probably correctly, that such an effort would have been vetoed, that does not excuse the failure to submit the matter as the law required. The USA was guilty of this same failure in its invasion of Iraq in 2004, and continues to pay the price for that failure). The issue of self-determination was raised after-the-fact and the so-called referenda were handled by Russia, by then an occupying power under the 4th Geneva Convention. That referendum violated the provisions of that Convention simply by being organized and managed by the occupying power. Beyond the legal argument was the clear absence of any moral legitimacy in such a rigged process.
Finally, there is a question of supremacy. The right to self-determination is a right recognized by international law, but all that law is dependent upon the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force in aggression, just as Article 51 protects the right to use force in individual or collective defense. Putin's violations, in fact, have violated not just Article 2(2) but all four of the subsections of Article 2:
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
That Putin's arguments are contradicted by the facts illustrate that the arguments carry no weight - or should.
Unfortunately, as Putin and other politicians (even some in our own country) have learned, a lie repeated loudly and often enough is likely to be accepted at some point. Unfortunate, but true.
Mr. Putin can end this war by withdrawing his troops to Russia, back to the borders agreed upon BY RUSSIA. Unfortunately, as some have argued, Putin has maintained that these agreements did not (despite the clear understanding of everyone else) guarantee anything for Ukraine (https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/08/russias-longstanding-problem-ukraines-borders). That this argument has any viability at all is due entirely to Putin's bad faith and long-held desire to restore, not just the territory of Ukraine, but of all that was once Imperial Russia to his control.
Peace will come when Russia is defeated. The fighting may stop for a while, but the war will not have ended.
I think that Jaimie Orr has made the correct analysis, including the cluster munitions issue in which U. S. criticism of their use has been predicated on risks to--or deliberate deployment against--noncombatants.
Two additional points: first, characterizing Yanukovych's February 2014 removal from office as a "coup" is Putin's word for the event. The Ukraine Parliament overwhelmingly voted to remove Yanukovych after he abandoned his position in February 2014 and left Kiev. Calling this a "coup" was a predictable spin by Putin, no doubt, given that Yanukovych fled to Russia and remains there, sentenced by Ukraine for treason.
Second, John Ryder's post puts a significant strain on the U. N. concept of self-determination of "peoples." The term, "peoples," is ambiguous in comparison with "nation." While grammatically plural, "peoples" can be applied to individuals. In that case, self-determination reasonably implies a right not to be the subject of political oppression such as denial of habeas corpus, extra-judicial confinement, starvation, assassination, threats of violence against family members, etc.
Self-determination at the individual level does not imply--at least not in the absence of overwhelming ancillary argument--a moral right to wage violence against one's alleged oppressors. For example, the right of self-determination does not entail a right of a January 6 rioter to attack a Capitol police office who was "oppressing" his or her attempt to trespass on Capitol grounds, or a restaurant patron to attack the hostess during a national health emergency when asked to present a COVID vaccination card. As a species of freedom, self-determination is full of exceptions and limitations, and is conditioned by the (legitimate) legal environment.
Does the self-determination of "peoples" apply to non-state subgroups? The general answer is "Yes," followed by several pages of exceptions, qualifications, and distinctions, but self-determination necessarily occurs in the context of law governing the people in question.
Here's an example. A subgroup of Californians in the northern part of the state have expressed a wish to secede from the state of California. That's not legally possible, so there is no "right" of self-determination in such a case. We don't have "autonomous republics" in the U. S., so that species of self-determination of a "peoples" is not applicable.
Ukraine is different in this regard, and consequently, the self-determination of Crimea was negotiated as an autonomous republic section of Ukraine. In 2014 (and now), that species of self-determination did not and does not include the unconstitutional secession of Crimea from Ukraine, let alone justify Crimea's self-declared parliament to sign a treaty of accession with Russia.
While, on the surface, the points raised in the post seem valid, there are some countervailing considerations that should be taken into account.
First, on the accusation that the US has abandoned principle when offering cluster munitions to Ukraine while the use by others - Russia in this case, but others as well - has been a subject of criticism by the United States, I am reminded of an analogy used by a political philosopher of the not-too-distant past. His observation was that of two men - one who pushed an old lady into the path of a bus, while another pushed an old lady out of the path of a bus. To refer to both of them simply as men who pushed little old ladies is to make a comparison that is puerile at best, reprehensible at worst.
The concern is that cluster munitions pose an unacceptable risk to the civilian population and other noncombantants. It is an unfortunate reality that ANY weapon, used improperly, can pose an unreasonable risk to the civilian population and other innocent noncombatants. Based on what is publicly available, it appears that the weapons provided by the USA to Ukraine are qualitatively different than those used by Russia and, indeed, those used in the past even by Ukraine. We also know that, while Ukraine goes to extraordinary lengths to protect the civilian population from unnecessary harm, Russia has been, and continues to deliberately target the civilian population. While Ukraine does intend to use these cluster munitions against Russian invading forces, there is every indication that appropriate care is being taken to minimize the risk to the civilian population. Some very good analysis on this subject has been posted on the website "Lawfire" managed by Prof. Charlie Dunlap of Duke law School (https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/tag/cluster-munitions/).
On the assertions by Russia that they are doing nothing more than "protecting" the right of self-determination of the residents of Crime and the other illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, several points need to be made.
First, Russia's action, an invasion and occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent invasion in 2022, several points need to be made: First, that there was no popular request for self-determination made before Russia's invasions. Second, Russia did not bring the matter to the UN SC raising these concerns before its violation of Article 2(4) by launching a war of aggression (even assuming, probably correctly, that such an effort would have been vetoed, that does not excuse the failure to submit the matter as the law required. The USA was guilty of this same failure in its invasion of Iraq in 2004, and continues to pay the price for that failure). The issue of self-determination was raised after-the-fact and the so-called referenda were handled by Russia, by then an occupying power under the 4th Geneva Convention. That referendum violated the provisions of that Convention simply by being organized and managed by the occupying power. Beyond the legal argument was the clear absence of any moral legitimacy in such a rigged process.
Finally, there is a question of supremacy. The right to self-determination is a right recognized by international law, but all that law is dependent upon the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force in aggression, just as Article 51 protects the right to use force in individual or collective defense. Putin's violations, in fact, have violated not just Article 2(2) but all four of the subsections of Article 2:
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
That Putin's arguments are contradicted by the facts illustrate that the arguments carry no weight - or should.
Unfortunately, as Putin and other politicians (even some in our own country) have learned, a lie repeated loudly and often enough is likely to be accepted at some point. Unfortunate, but true.
Mr. Putin can end this war by withdrawing his troops to Russia, back to the borders agreed upon BY RUSSIA. Unfortunately, as some have argued, Putin has maintained that these agreements did not (despite the clear understanding of everyone else) guarantee anything for Ukraine (https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/08/russias-longstanding-problem-ukraines-borders). That this argument has any viability at all is due entirely to Putin's bad faith and long-held desire to restore, not just the territory of Ukraine, but of all that was once Imperial Russia to his control.
Peace will come when Russia is defeated. The fighting may stop for a while, but the war will not have ended.
I think that Jaimie Orr has made the correct analysis, including the cluster munitions issue in which U. S. criticism of their use has been predicated on risks to--or deliberate deployment against--noncombatants.
Two additional points: first, characterizing Yanukovych's February 2014 removal from office as a "coup" is Putin's word for the event. The Ukraine Parliament overwhelmingly voted to remove Yanukovych after he abandoned his position in February 2014 and left Kiev. Calling this a "coup" was a predictable spin by Putin, no doubt, given that Yanukovych fled to Russia and remains there, sentenced by Ukraine for treason.
Second, John Ryder's post puts a significant strain on the U. N. concept of self-determination of "peoples." The term, "peoples," is ambiguous in comparison with "nation." While grammatically plural, "peoples" can be applied to individuals. In that case, self-determination reasonably implies a right not to be the subject of political oppression such as denial of habeas corpus, extra-judicial confinement, starvation, assassination, threats of violence against family members, etc.
Self-determination at the individual level does not imply--at least not in the absence of overwhelming ancillary argument--a moral right to wage violence against one's alleged oppressors. For example, the right of self-determination does not entail a right of a January 6 rioter to attack a Capitol police office who was "oppressing" his or her attempt to trespass on Capitol grounds, or a restaurant patron to attack the hostess during a national health emergency when asked to present a COVID vaccination card. As a species of freedom, self-determination is full of exceptions and limitations, and is conditioned by the (legitimate) legal environment.
Does the self-determination of "peoples" apply to non-state subgroups? The general answer is "Yes," followed by several pages of exceptions, qualifications, and distinctions, but self-determination necessarily occurs in the context of law governing the people in question.
Here's an example. A subgroup of Californians in the northern part of the state have expressed a wish to secede from the state of California. That's not legally possible, so there is no "right" of self-determination in such a case. We don't have "autonomous republics" in the U. S., so that species of self-determination of a "peoples" is not applicable.
Ukraine is different in this regard, and consequently, the self-determination of Crimea was negotiated as an autonomous republic section of Ukraine. In 2014 (and now), that species of self-determination did not and does not include the unconstitutional secession of Crimea from Ukraine, let alone justify Crimea's self-declared parliament to sign a treaty of accession with Russia.
It seems we gave our word in the Budapest Memorandum. What would be left of it if our promises to prevent nuclear proliferation are meaningless?